(From The Idaho Statesman, written by Edward Lotterman)
A securities lawsuit in my home town is just one of hundreds, if not thousands, that will eventually be filed in the wake of the ongoing financial debacle. But it illustrates eternal issues in financial markets, ones that are present even during booms, even though they lead to litigation more frequently during busts.
At issue: the level of detail that sellers of investments must use in informing the buyers of any risks involved; and what role, if any, government or the courts should play to ensure that the buyers understand what they are getting into.
This particular lawsuit involves “structured investment vehicles” holding subprime mortgages that eventually went bust. They were sold by Wells Fargo Bank to local philanthropic foundations. The situation resembles disputes around nonprofits such as hospitals and local governments that borrowed money via “auction rate securities.” The common thread is how much disclosure of risk is necessary
What role one thinks government or the courts should play in these situations depends on one’s beliefs about how perfectly markets operate.
To individuals like Milton Friedman or Alan Greenspan, who believe unregulated markets nearly always result in better outcomes, the answer is that government should stay out.
Yes, perhaps there should be some criminal statutes governing deliberate fraud, but otherwise, the old principle of “buyer beware” should rule. Any government action will increase costs for society and waste resources, this group argues.
At the other end of the scale, those who are skeptical that free markets ever result in good outcomes want extensive disclosures of risks, combined with broad bans on selling specific categories of investments to certain potential buyers.
In between are pragmatists like me who are convinced that disparities of information between sellers and buyers of financial securities can lead to outcomes that not only hurt individual investors but also can harm society as a whole. At the same time, not all such problems can be fixed easily by regulation. And regulation inevitably uses up some resources.
So it is necessary to find a middle ground.
One long-established policy is to ban putting money held for vulnerable third parties into investments deemed risky. Thus, laws long have specified that inheritances held in trust for minors can be put only in well-rated bonds or stocks. State insurance regulators often imposed similar rules on life insurance companies and pension funds.
One problem is that this depends on the competency and honesty of ratings firms, an assumption that has been shot full of holes in the past three years.
The larger problem is that lower risk means lower returns. Large pension funds, in particular, eventually demanded the right to invest in higher-yielding assets, even if this involved taking on more risk. Restrictions on government and private pension fund portfolios were progressively eased in recent decades.
When markets are booming and most securities provide satisfactory returns, no one complains. But whenever a bubble pops, some investors get hurt and are convinced that they were tricked by whoever sold them the investment. Lawsuits are inevitable.
From the point of view of society, it is important that the law be written as clearly as possible to minimize such litigation, which inevitably consumes resources.
In the meantime, we are stuck in a familiar cycle where investors want freedom to deploy their money freely when the horizon is clear but demand protection when it starts to rain. And financial firms want freedom to sell any product they can dream up and not bear any of the consequences as long as they furnish enough small-print boilerplate disclosures.
It all means securities attorneys will always have work.